On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
Web1 de ago. de 2005 · This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff … Web1 de ago. de 1974 · This note shows the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas when foreign retaliation is allowed for. Using a Cournot-Johnson type of retaliation mechanism …
On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
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WebThis paper outlines a method consistent with trade theory to establish equivalent quotas for tariffs that are not reduced fully. This is approach agreed to in the 2004 WTO Framework … Web1 de mai. de 1988 · The purpose of this paper is to use a conjectural variation approach to examine the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, set so as to result in the same …
Web30 de jun. de 2011 · The Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Tariff-Rate Quota System: A Case Study of Rice Chi-Chung Chen , Professor, Department of Applied Economics, National Chung-Hsing University, #250 Kuo-Kuang Road, Taichung 402, Taiwan (corresponding author: phone: 886-4-22858137; fax: 886-4-22860255; e-mail: … Web15 de ago. de 2006 · We show that, in both cases, open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff-quota equivalence holds, …
WebTariffs, Quotas, and International Oligopoly. Oxford Economic Paper 41 (4): 749–775. Hwang, H., and C. C. Mai (1988). On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under Duopoly. Journal of International Economics 24 (3): 373–380. Google Scholar Itoh, M., and Y. Ono (1984). Tariffs vs. Quotas under Duopoly of Heterogeneous Goods. WebAlthough tariffs and quotas are generally equivalent to each other in terms of their static price and welfare effects, this equivalence does not remain true in the face of market changes. In the next sections we consider three such market changes: an increase in domestic demand, an increase in domestic supply, and a decrease in the world price.
Web23 de jul. de 2005 · This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue.
Web1 de nov. de 1975 · This paper investigates the equivalence of optimal import tariffs and quotas in a Cournot duopoly model when firms have more information about demand … how big can ants getWeb1 de fev. de 1971 · ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS: A COMMENT ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS: A COMMENT Walter, Ingo 1971-02-01 00:00:00 I N G O WALTER Figure I a static-equivalent quota will prove to be superior in a softening marltct. This general proposition can be easily discerned from the diagram … how big can an int beWebtariffs and equivalent quotas have the same effect on domestic price if home and foreign firms engage in Cournot quantity competition. But if the firms engage in Bertrand price competition, tariffs and equivalent quotas are different in terms of their effects on domestic price and profits as shown by Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989). how many mph is 3600 rpmWeb1 de ago. de 1974 · This note shows the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas when foreign retaliation is allowed for. Using a Cournot-Johnson type of retaliation mechanism it is shown that, contrary to the case of tariffs, quota retaliation will lead to the elimination of international trade between the countries involved. References (7) how many mph is 40 kilometers per hourWeb1 de jan. de 2024 · Bhagwati initiated the discussion on the comparative properties of tariffs and quotas and showed that the equivalence result is restricted to cases that are characterized by competitive market structures.In the context of a partial equilibrium model, he demonstrated that the presence of monopoly power in production and/or in quota … how big can an outbuilding beWeb1 de out. de 2011 · Under market demand uncertainty, we show that quotas can result in a welfare advantage over tariffs for an importing country despite that its government does … how big can a norway rat getWebDescription: This paper considers the effects of trade policy-tariffs and quotas-when importing is done by competitive traders who are identical ex ante but differ ex post. We show that the standard equivalence results no longer hold and the conventional ranking of tariffs and quotas is turned on its head: ... how big can an ocelot get